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Congressional action to cut $2.9 billion from the FY
1986 DoD budget has settled the question of whether retire-
ments benefits will be decreased. The decrease will affect
only those individuals entering the services after the
proposal is signed into law. The Pentagon is concerned with
how this action will affect the attraction of new recruits
and the retention of career personnel. Previous reviews of
the retirement system have proposed reducing the annuities
of the retiree as a method to reduce cost. A fully
supported Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program would
reduce the costs of retirement while providing an adequate
number of personnel to maintain national security. SRBs
would provide incentive for career personnel in undermanned
ratings to continue service. The desired savings can be
attained by reducing the future annuities of overmanned
ratings. To succeed there must be monetary offsets estab-
lished during active duty to reduce the effects of lower
retirement annuities. The political sensitivity of the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In a period of global conflicts, Americans have made the
commitment to retain a strong "peace time" military. This
commitment has been made with the understanding that mili-
tary members and their families would be adequately cared
for during active service. Retirement annuities are paid to
career service personnel to augment their post-service
incomes. Congress has identified the military retirement
system, as well as many domestic programs, as prime candi-
dates to reduce this deficit. Because of the federal
deficit, documentation of requirements has stiffened. The
Department of Defense, in support of all expenditures, has
been hard pressed to justify personnel costs. The task of
major decision makers is to determine to what extent the
existing retirement system contributes to national security
and if it is cost effective. Furthermore, if retirement
benefits are reduced, how would this affect the manning of
an all volunteer force?
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to compare the current
non-disability military retirement system with past propo-
sals, and to present an alternative retirement plan. This
alternative is the use of selective reenlistment bonuses to
9
retain personnel in undermanned ratings. The thesis will
address proposals generated by Presidential and
Congressional decree and will compare these with the present
system. Whether the current system is excessive or not will
be addressed because this thesis is an objective investiga-
tion of the economic efficiency of the current and proposed
retirement systems.
The thesis shows, using the concept of present value,
that increasing the selective reenlistment bonuses would
lead to substantial reductions in the cost of military
retirement. This savings can be attained by reducing
retirement costs for personnel in overmanned ratings, yet
preserving the value of retirement for personnel in under-
manned ratings. SRB's would be targeted to attain adequate
numbers of enlisted personnel and officers.
C . BACKGROUND
Efforts to change the military retirement system have
persisted and continue to consume congressional attention.
Military leaders, on the one hand, oppose change while
certain members of Congress, on the other hand, lead the
fight for reform. Both sides must focus on the one central
issue: "Does the Uniformed Services retirement system effec-
tively accomplish national security objectives"?
The purpose of the military retirement system is to
support and complement the manpower force management
requirements of the Services to meet nation security
10
objectives [Ref. 1: p. 1-1] • The current structure and
level of retirement benefits are the result of more than a
century of modifications of the retirement system. The last
major legislative modification in this process was the
Defense Officers Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) . No
comparable legislation has been enacted for enlisted
personnel. Congress has chosen to have the Services manage
them through their respective administrative and reenlist-
ment policies. The final and more recent legislative
concern has been the increasing cost of retirement. In
1963, post-retirement recomputation of retirees' pay based
upon active duty pay tables gave way to using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). Since 1963 military pay has been adjusted
based upon the percentage increase of the CPI. This action
was intended to reduce cost. In the process, the Civil
Service and Uniformed Services systems were linked. The
rising of the CPI has, in some years, caused the retiree
adjustment to exceed the capped, active duty pay adjustment.
Congress has actively considered limiting the post-
retirement adjustments to less than the full CPI, again, as
a means of reducing retirement costs.
11
II. HISTORY OF THE NON-DISABILITY MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Although some pensions were paid to veterans early in
this nations history, no legislative authority existed
before an 1855 statute which provided for compulsory retire-
ment of certain Navy officers [Ref. 2: p. 145]. A more
complete statute, passed in 1861 (12 Stat. 287), became the
first non-disability retirement act. This act and subseq-
uent acts in 1861 (12 Stat. 329) and 1862 (12 Stat. 594 )
provided for involuntary retirement of regular officers of
all branches of service. This involuntary retirement could
occur after 40 years of service or at age 62. The govern-
ment could force an officer to retire after reaching the
specified age or length of service. While these laws
authorized involuntary retirement, they did not require the
government to exercise it [Ref. 1: p. VII-2] . Two enduring
retirement principles were established along with reduction
in forces in 1870; voluntary retirement of officers after 30
years of service and retired pay fixed at 75 percent of pay
of the officer's grade [Ref. 1: p. VII-3].
An Act in August 29, 1916 established two new principles
for the non-disability retirement system. First, officer
selection boards were established in the Navy for promotion
to Commander, Captain and Rear Admiral to alleviate promo-
tion stagnation (allow upward mobility within the force
12
structure). Second, this action integrated the retirement
program with an up-or-out officer selection promotion plan.
Those not selected for promotion were retired at 2.5 percent
of pay per year of service, not to exceed 75 percent of pay.
This established the formula for computation of retired pay.
[Ref. 1: p. VIII-3]
To alleviate promotion stagnation caused by the large
influx of officers in the World War I years, the Act of June
23, 1938 was passed, revising the Navy's officer selection
and retirement process. The selection board system was
extended to all grades above Lieutenant junior grade. Limits
on years of service for Lieutenant Commander through Captain
were established, and voluntary retirement at 20 years of
service at the discretion of the President was permitted.
This became the model for the present 20-year non-disability
retirement system [Ref. 1: p. VIII-27]
.
In the period following World War II until 1948, several
laws were passed to standardize the officer retirement and
promotion system among the Services. The statutory retire-
ment age was lowered from 64 to 62 and voluntary retirement
after 20 years of active service was permitted with retire-
ment pay computed under the formula of 2.5 percent per year
of service. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 incorporated
the various Services' retirement and promotion systems in
one piece of legislation. There remained some differences
between the Army/Air Force program and the Navy/Marines
13
Corps program [Ref. 2: p. 158]. No major changes occurred
until the Defense Officers Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
was adopted December 12, 1980 to make retirement authority-
uniform across the different Services. The next portion of
this section will explain the history of retirement pay
adjustments
.
Post-retirement adjustment to retired pay began with the
Appropriation Acts of July 15, 1870 which provided for
adjustment in the retired pay of officers who were already
retired based on the new active duty rate [Ref. 2: p. 158].
This adjustment became known as a "recomputation" of retired
pay and was alternately repealed and reinstated until 1963.
[Ref. 1: p. VII-8]. The uniformed services Pay Act of 1963
replaced the recomputation method with an adjustment proce-
dure based on increase in cost of- living measured by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) [Ref. 2: p. 145]. Although the
formula has been modified several times, the concept of
adjusting retirement pay based on the CPI increase is still
in use today.
In 1982 Congress passed a law which temporarily capped
cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) at one-half the assumed
inflation rate until FY 1985, COLA increases in fiscal years
14
1983, 1984, and 1985 [Ref. 3: p. 2]. In April 1984 Congress
passed legislation delaying the May 1984 COLA increase to
January 1, 1985 and created a new base period for calcu-
lating retired COLA similar to the quarter-to-quarter
formula used for social security recipients.
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981
changed the method of computing retirement for those
entering the Service after September 7, 1980. The member's
monthly retired pay base is now computed as the average of
the member's highest three years of basic pay instead of his
terminal basic pay. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) has
stated that the high-three plan cut the value of retirement
by about 13 percent [Ref. 4: p. 28]. Other recent legisla-
tion requiring rounding down to the nearest dollar the
initially computed gross retired pay, and amended the six-
month rounding rule have lowered retired pay [Ref. 4: p.
28], In fact, all changes to the military retirement system
since 1975 have been at the retiree's expense.
15
III. SHOULD THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM BE CHANGED ?
Military retirement pension policy has been a major
topic of discussion among military manpower planners for
numerous years. Congress has demanded reviews of the
system, seeking answers to question such as: What current
rules need changing? What savings could be attained? What
would be the repercussion of such changes? This chapter
will address the advantages and disadvantages to changing
the present military retirement system.
A. BENEFITS OF CHANGE
1. Comparability
Comparisons are often made between the military
retirement system and civilian plans. It is generally
agreed that the military retirement system provides more
generous benefits than are available in most non-military
plans. Together with social security, the cost of benefits
for military retirees amounts to about 40 percent of mili-
tary salary. Salary is defined as the sum of basic pay,
allowances for quarters and subsistence, and the tax advan-
tage that occurs because the allowances are exempt from
federal taxes [Ref. 5: p. xv] . Typical private-sector
pension plans offered by large employers, in combination
with Social Security, have total accrual costs of roughly 14
percent of salary (not including the cost of retirement
16
related fringe benefits, thrift plans, stock options, and
other types of deferred compensation, which have a combined
average cost of 2 percent of salary). The Civil Service
Retirement System has an accrual cost equal to about 30
percent of salary (net of the employee's contribution). The
advantage afforded by the military system over civil service
and other systems lies not so much in its higher level of
annual benefits as in the length of time they are received.
Military retirees often begin receiving benefits around age
40; most other retirees do not receive benefits until age 60
[Ref. 5: p. xvii] . Table I lists typical monthly annuities
received by military officers and enlisted personnel, while
Table II shows the cost as a percentage of the Department of
Defense and Federal Budgets.
• Benefits under specialized government plans resemble
military benefits more closely. Military retirement is
slightly more generous than benefits for federal air traffic
controllers and, with some exceptions, those for state and
local policemen and firemen. Federal protective services
personnel leaving after 20 years also receive smaller
benefits than military retirees, but slightly higher
benefits after 30 years of service. [Ref. 5: p. xvii]
Other countries' military retirement plans differ
from that of the United States in many ways, including age
at retirement, minimum length of service, integration with
social insurance, and inflation protection. In general,
17
TABLE I











0-5 20 1,641 569,440
E-8 30 1,543 404,032
E-7 20 771 263,015
(Note: The values in the last column are not present value
figures )
.
Source: Department of Defense, "FY 1983 DoD Statistical
Report on the Military Retirement" (Arlington, Va: Office
of Actuary, Defense Manpower Data Center, 1984, p. 249
U.S. military retired pay exceeds that under most other
countries. For 20 year retirees the U.S. system is consid-
erably more generous than most, while for 30-year personnel
it generally pays only slightly higher benefits. [Ref. 5:
p. xviii] Australia is an exception, the generosity of the
20 year retirement for that country is higher than the
United States. However, the thirty year retirement benefits
are not greater than the United States [Ref. 6: p. VII-29]
.
The concept of present value is critical to under-
standing of the value of an annuity. The present value of a
future payment or series of payments represents the amount
received today that would be equivalent in value to the
future payment or payments. The future value of a sum of
money held today refers to the amount that would be
18
TABLE II
UNIFORMED SERVICES RETIREMENT COSTS
Budget Outlays Military
(Billions) Retirement as Total Cost Per
FY Nominal Constant % of % of Ret. Retiree
Ret. Cost 85 $ cost Fed. DoD (000) (Con. 85)
1940 .11 .87 .7 1.5 50
1950 .22 .95 .5 1.7 130 7307
1960 .77 2.57 .8 1.7 250 10280
1970 3.20 8.04 1.5 3.7 760 10579
1980 12.50 16.15 2.0 8.5 1260 12817
1982 14.90 16.50 2.0 8.1 1300 12692
1984 17.10 17.30 1.9 6.0 1380 12536
(Note: Con. 85 means dollar values are 1985 dollars.)
Source: Department of Defence, "Fifth Quadrennial Review of
Military Compensation, Volume 1, Uniformed Services
Retirement System" Washington, D.C. Office of the Secretary
of Defense, January 1984), p. VIII-6
accumulated at some future date if the sum of money was
invested at a particular rate of return (or interest rate).
Thus, in present value terms, $100 received one year from
now, has a present value (today) of $95, if the discount
rate is 5 percent. The reason is that if $95 is invested at
an annual interest rate of 5 percent in one year it will
appreciate in value to $ 100. Therefore, if $100 is a
19
future payment, then it has to be discounted back to today's
value. This is accomplished by using a discount rate. With
a discount rate of 5 percent the future $100 has a value of
$95 today.
Another example of present value is if a $1000 lump
sum payment is received now, it has a present value of
$1000. This value remains constant despite the individual's
discount rate. However, if this lump sum payment is to be
received in the future, the discount rate will reduce the
value of the payment today. If the payment is to be
received ten years in the future the value today of that
$1000 payment, discounted at a 3 percent rate, is $744.
Table III shows the value of a $1000 payment if it were
received ten years in the future using different discount
rates .
TABLE III
PRESENT VALUE OF $1000 USING DIFFERENT DISCOUNT RATES
Payment Is To Be Received in 10 Years
Discount Rate Current Va lue Present Value
10 Years From Now





The Department of Defense recognizes the time value
of money and its relationship with government expenditures.
As stated in a Department Instruction, Economic Analysis and
20
Program Evaluation for Resource Management :
rates will be treated as a cost which is" related to
all government expenditures.... This policy is based on
the premise that no public investment would be under-
taken without explicitly considering the alternative use
of the funds which it absorbs or displaces.
Money has a value directly linked to the time of its
receipt. This time factor is what makes the military
retirement pension so generous compared to other systems.
For example a Commander (0-5) retiring during 1985 after
twenty years of service receives an annual pension of
$21,084. Suppose he starts receiving this at age 43 until
his death at age 73. This pension has a present value at
the time of retirement of $198,758 using an interest rate of
10 percent. Most Americans work in a labor force which has
placed the retirement age at about 62-65. If the present
value is computed for both individuals at age 43, the
civilian worker (who retires at age 62) would have to draw
an annual annuity to age 73 of $97,385 to be comparable to
the military retiree.
While the above illustration may not be evident to
those unfamiliar with the present value concept, it does
demonstrate the dramatic impact time has on the value of
money. (This is discussed in more detail below)
The Digest of Selected Pension Plans lists numerous
pension plans for civilian occupations [Ref. 7: pp. 43-59].
Tables IV and V list the annuities and present values of
21
selected pension plans for civilian occupations which are
similar to military ratings. To compare with military
retirement the present value at retirement age, which is
between 60-65 for civilians, has been discounted back to age
43, using a 10 percent discount rate (43 is approximately
the time a military annuity starts for an officer. ) For
example, the present value of an annuity for an 0-5 with 20
years to service is $198,758. At the twenty year point the
0-5 has an income of about $45,000 and his retirement
annuity is $21,084. Of the sixteen civilian occupations
reviewed the retirement plan of the Maritime Pilot (a harbor
pilot, who guides ships in and out of ports) had the closest
annuity payment of that of an 0-5. At twenty years of
service the Maritime Pilot receives an annuity
.
of $16,551
and the present value of this annuity, assuming mortality at
age 73, is $88,302 at age 65. To compare this amount with
the annuity of the 0-5, it must be discounted back to age
43. At that point the value of the civilian annuity is
$10,861. This is much lower than the $198,758 for the 0-5.
At 30 years of service the 0-5 's annuity has increased to
$32,736 as compared to the civilian Pilot's thirty years of
service annuity of $24,804. The present value discounted
back to age 43 is $278,714 for the officer and $16,276 for
the civilian.
A similar enlisted example, is an E-7 at 20 years of
service who has an annual annuity of $9,912 and an annual
22
income of about $25,000. Of the sixteen civilian
occupations represented, only the Boilermakers Union had an
annuity close to the E-7's -- at $9,219. Most civilian
annuities at this pay level are in the $5-7,000 range.
Computing the present values of both annuities, as was done
above for the officer and Maritime Pilot, the E-7's annuity
has a present value of $95,234 at age 39 while the
Boilermaker's annuity has a value of $6,049 for 20 years of
service and $9,120 for 30 years of service.
The time in which annuities are available is an
important relationship. In Tables IV and the civilian
annuities are received for only 8-13 years using a mortality
age of 73 , where as the military annuities are drawn over a
30-34 year time period. A definite conclusion can be drawn
that the military retirement annuities are more generous
than civilian annuities. The most significant factor is not
the size of the annuities, but rather the length of time in
which the military personnel draw these benefits.
The civilian pension plan reviewed designated ages
62 and 65 as retirement ages. Some companies allow earlier
retirement. If an individual retires at an earlier age,
receiving a less generous annuity, then the present value of
that annuity is reduced.
23
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PENSION PLANS AND PRESENT VALUES AFTER 30 YOS
Company Income Ret. Annuity P.V. P.V.
Name Range Age after 30 YOS at Ret . Age at 43
American 20000 62 5616 36475 5982
Standard 32500 8861 57552 9438
45000 12417 80648 13226
Long 20000 65 5616 29961 3685
Shoreman 32500 5616 29961 3685
45000 5616 29961 3685
Boeing 20000 62 6333 41132 6745
Machinist 32500 10233 66463 10899
45000 15178 98581 16167
Boiler 20000 65 13899 74151 9120
Makers 32599 13899 74151 9120
45000 13899 74151 9120
Carp ' ters 20000 65 6318 33606 4145
32500 6318 33606 4145
45000 6318 33606 4145
Elect. 20000 65 2808 14980 1843
Cont
.
32500 2808 14980 1843
45000 2808 14980 1843
Utility 20000 60 6910 49081 9718
Workers 32500 11528 81883 16212
45000 16130 114571 22685
Operating 20000 62 5616 36476 5982
Engineers 32500 7020 45594 7477
45000 8424 54714 8973
Exxon 20000 65 6255 33370 4104
32500 11622 62003 7626
45000 17316 92380 11362
T * phone 20000 65 6910 36864 4534
Workers 32500 11528 61501 7564
45000 16128 86042 10583
Clerical 20000 65 4087 21805 2682
Workers 32500 8065 43206 5292
26
Table V
Pension Plans and Present "V
(Con't)
ralues after 30 YOS
Company Income Ret. Annuity P.V. P.V.
Name Range Age after 30 YOS at Ret . Age s at 43
45000 12200 65082 8005
IBM 20000 65 7020 37451 4606
32500 7893 42112 5179
45000 11013 58754 7226
Maritime 20000 65 7020 37451 4606
Union 32500 7020 37451 4606
45000 7020 37451 4606
Maritime 20000 65 10639 56760 6981
Pilots 32500 17737 94627 11639
45000 24804 132329 16276
Aviation 20000 65 5319 28380 3490
Machinist 32500 10046 53596 6592
45000 15085 80479 9898
Steel 20000 65 6208 33123 4074
32500 9750 52016 6397
45000 13650 72822 8957
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent.
2. Retired Pay Costs
• As stated earlier, much of the attention and criti-
cism of the military retirement system is caused by the
sheer magnitude of retired pay cost. The 13 billion dollars
paid to military retirees in FY 1983 represents the highest
cost ever and the estimated 17.5 billion dollars for 1985
demonstrate the extent of the growth in spending of the
taxpayers' dollars. [Ref. 8: p. 17]
In FY 1983 the average number of years-of service
at retirement of the service member is 22.4 and the average
age at retirement is 47.4. In Fy 1983, 45 percent of the
military personnel who retired that year completed exactly
20 years of service (YOS) [Ref. 6: p. 1-7]. As shown in
27
Table I the monthly annuity and expected lifetime retired
pay is a considerable amount. As shown in Table II there
has been significant growth in the active force non-
disability retirement budget outlays over the past 30 years.
Analysis of FY 55 to FY 82 active force retirement cost
growth indicates that 55 percent of the increased cost of
retirement was due simply to inflation. This increase is
in nominal dollars and does not raise real costs.
Increasing real costs, came from an eleven-fold increase in
the retired population (19 percent) and from wage growth (21
percent), which is the increase of wages above the influx of
inflation. [Ref. 6: p. IV-34] Thus over the span of 37
years real retirement costs have increased 40 percent.
Assuming a constant total force size, the rate of growth in
retirement cost should decrease. The total cost of retire-
ment therefore is expected to keep rising: however, the
rate of growth is expected to decrease. [Ref. 6: p. IV-34]
3 . Structure of Pay
The military pay structure does not yield any
differentials in incomes based on type of skill or rating.
Pay rates are set to correspond to the established pay
grades. This means that cooks get the same pay as
technicians, assuming, they are in the same pay grade. Such
a rigid pay scale offers too little incentive for the more
demanding ratings. These ratings require people who are of
higher quality and who receive more training. Since
28
retirement is a function of base pay, this pay inadequacy is
carried over into the retirement system. Just as active
duty pay does not depend on the skill, risk factor, or
education level, neither does the retirement system.
Supporters of the current system justify it by
pointing to the hardships and amount of risk involved on the
job. Many of these supporters feel that these hardships
should be offset by high annuities in retirement. What these
supporters should be arguing for instead is higher supple-
mental proficiency pays while on active duty. The arduous
duty and risk involved in assignments such as submarine
duty, sea duty, and flight crew, demand higher pay. The
people assigned to these jobs are receiving proficiency pay
now, and if retention and attainment of these people are too
low then it is appropriate to raise this type of pay. It is
not efficient to raise the pay of everyone on active duty,
as an across the board basic pay increase does. Similarly,
high pensions for everyone, regardless of risk or other
hardships incurred, are an inefficient way to pay retirees.
The hardships and risks endured by military personnel are
important and relevant items for demanding higher pay.
However higher pensions are an inefficient way to pay
retirees
.
There is one case when it is appropriate to raise
retirees' pay along with that of active duty personnel. This
is an effective way to pay retirees whose discount rates are
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lower than that of the government. As will be shown in the
chapter on discount rates, in such a case it is cheaper for
the government to pay higher annuities over a period of time
instead of large lump sum payments.
4. Changes In Technology
Advances in technology since World War II have had a
dramatic impact on the quality of personnel required by the
military. "Smart Bombs" and "Star Wars' weapon systems have
increased the use and operation of data processing systems.
Clearly the armed forces' need for trained, experienced
personnel is much greater and more pressing today than in
the 1940s. By necessity the length of service consistent
with the military training investment in people is much
longer. [Ref. 9: p. 7]
The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation addresses the problem of the different demands
between the technician and foot soldier in its findings:
The retirement system will help the retention of quality
personnel only when the overall compensation system is
adequate to recruit and retain quality in the short term
and to draw sufficient personnel to the point of retire-
ment. The retirement incentive is a predominant part of
an individual's decision process. This requires a
careful balance between current and deferred compensa-
tion as well as Service force management poli-
cies Meaningful analyses of the retirement system
must use a requirements-based methodology and an analyt-
ical approach that focuses on force structure. [Ref. 6:
pp. IV 29-30]
The QRMC made the following recommendation towards the
retirement policy:
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The evaluations of retirement system alternatives must
analyze force impact. The risk of excessive departures
from the military of trained and experienced personnel
must be examined carefully to determine the impact on
force structure . [Ref. 6: p. IV 35]
The basic purpose of all of the QRMC alternatives was to
promote budgetary savings. But their alternatives would
also have some side affects, such as increased incentives to
lengther careers
.
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHANGE
In the previous section, the benefits of change were
discussed. In this section the principle arguments
supporting the present system will be addressed. The intent
of the next two subsections is not to promote the current
system, but rather to address the issues the supporters have
given as reasons not to change. When there is a possible
solution to their argument, it will be stated.
Some of those who oppose the system say the military
retirement system is too generous when compared to the
private sector plans. A General Accounting Office (GAO)
study shows that it is also more generous than the retire-
ment plans of other public safety forces. But behind the
emotion laden debate over whether reduction in the value of
retirement are a breach of faith with military personnel,
there are questions about whether the current programs
encourage the right mix of people to stay in the service for
the right amount of time. [Ref. 10: p. 624] Both of these
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questions will be discussed in further detail in the
following sections. The primary arguments against change
are more qualitative than quantitative. Almost every argu-
ment of equity, concerning changes to the retirement system,
has a quantitative solution (use monetary offsets to solve
the problem)
.
1. Breach of Faith
Several equity arguments have been used in the past
by defenders and critics of the military retirement system.
Defenders contend that current retirees and service members
have an implicit contract with the government protecting
their right to benefits under the current retirement system.
They argue that the system in place at the time of enlist-
ment (or even at the time a recruit signs a contract commit-
ting him to enter service at some future date) is an
integral part of the terms of service offered by the govern-
ment. But proponents of changing the system note the absence
of any explicit legal contract and point to many changes in
military compensation that have worked to the advantage of
those currently in service or retired (for example, annual
adjustment of active-duty pay to reflect changes in private-
sector wages and salaries).
If the change in the retirement system is viewed by
career personnel as a threat to their future retirement
benefits, then the change is a potential threat to the
effectiveness of a new retirement system. Those who support
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changing the current retirement system state that the
current system will be "grandfathered" (meaning it will not
affect the benefits of those personnel already on active
duty or retired). But many members lack faith and believe
that the grandfather clause would not be over-ruled at a
later date. An example of such a broken promise to retired
military personnel was the promise to use of full CPI annual
increases to adjust for cost of living increases. In the
recent past, these increases have been a fraction of the
full CPI increase, and at times the effective date has been
delayed. These action have been taken to save money in a
period of high federal deficits. It is highly conceivable
that career military personnel will view any change as an
attack on their future benefits, and some may leave the
military because of this action. The supporters of change
have not formulated a satisfactory quantitative solution to
this distrust.
Some supporters of the current system say that
reducing retirement benefits would affect recruiting. This
argument is hard to support because only 12 percent of
active duty recruits ever become eligible to receive retired
pay [Ref. 5: p. 17]. Another argument against a retirement
system change adversely affecting recruiting is that indi-
viduals at this age have extremely high discount rates, thus
making the value of the retirement is not an enlistment
consideration. Defenders of the current system counter the
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argument by noting that the military personnel system
operates differently from those of private-sector firms or
government civilian agencies , and that a sharply tapered
benefit structure may be required by military manpower
needs. The argument has some validity, but the rebuttal is
the same as with any equity argument: Changes in retirement
system are justified only if they support the attainment of
national security at the least cost. Thus equity considera-
tions, whether raised to defend or attack the current
system, are, first, hard to support, and second, of very
little importance to government savings.
2. Attraction and Rention of Quality Personnel
Military leaders perceive the need for a youthful
and vigorous military establishment. This concept refers to
the popularized image of the combat infantry-man and not to
the highly skilled technician.
Admiral Watkins summarized the military problem in
attaining the proper quality of military personnel when he
addressed the House of Representatives in April 1985.
Discussing the importance of highly trained enlisted
personnel to operate technically advanced weapons he stated:
"We can no longer take people off the streets and off park
benches and put them into Aegis Cruisers". [Ref. 10: p.
625]
The need for highly trained personnel can be
attained by the use of reallocation of money into bonus
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plans to support attraction and retention. Defense manning
problems differ not only by grade but by Service, by assign-
ment and, particularly, by skill. A large percentage of DoD
skills are currently either overmanned or undermanned by at
least 10 percent. [Ref. 11: p. IV-4] These manning problems
persist for extended periods because existing management
tools are either not used sufficiently, or, if used, prove
inadequate to the task.
Before any changes are made to the current system
one should look at not only costs factor, but also the
manpower requirements. Table VI shows these manpower
requirements, as projected by the Department of Defense.
Military services have historically been among the strongest
supporters of the current system. The the Services feel
that any less generous alternative might be less effective
in meeting manpower objectives.
The need for trained mid-career personnel as
depicted by Table VI is a claim that military leaders use
to defend the current retirement system. Certain factors
often make a transfer from military to civilian life attrac-
tive before completion of 20 years. One of these factors is
the frequency of promotion, which typically slows dramati-
cally after 10 years of service, with the result that
members feel they are not being rewarded for improvements in
skill or productivity [Ref. 5: p. xvi] . The current system
gives personnel the incentive to continue military service
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with less chance of promotion although their productivity is
still high. A less generous retirement may sway the deci-
sion in favor of civilian employment.
TABLE VI
CURRENT FORCE OBJECTIVES
Enlisted Personnel Officers Total
YOS Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
0-4 1,016,400 56.3 84,700 31.4 1,101,100 53.1
5-10 407,300 22.6 81,600
11-15 177,500 9.8 45,100
16-20 147,500 8.2 35,400
21-30 56,400 3.1 22,400
Total 1,805,100 100.0 269,200
Source: Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation,
Vol. I. pp. XI- 5, XI -6
In conclusion of this section, a few general state-
ments are offered. If the Services are short in skilled
ratings they can use bonuses to man these ratings. If the
Services can not attract the proper quality of recruit, they
can use monetary rewards, such as bonuses or education
benefits to achieve this goal. If the Services find certain
ratings have greater risks, which affect retention, they can
30 .3 488,900 23,,6
16 .7 222,600 10,,7
13 .2 182,900 8,,8
8 .4 78,800 3 ,8
00 .0 2,074,300 100,,0
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use bonuses to man these ratings. However, using across the
board pay raises to increase retention rates is an ineffi-
cient way to man the Services
.
C. RETIREMENT ANNUITIES
The current military retirement system is directly
linked to Basic Pay and length of service. Tables VII and
VIII show the annual amounts paid to retirees. These pay
scales are used for all calculations in this thesis.
TABLE VII
ANNUAL NON- DISABILITY RETIRED PAY (ENLISTED)
YEARS OF SERVICE
GRADE 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
E-9 12816 14844 16188 16850 19248 19980 20724 21468 22200
E-8 11232 13080 14268 14868 17184 17844 18704 19164 19836
E-7 9912 11640 12696 13224 15456 16056 16656 17244 17844
E-6 8676 9552 10416 10848 11280 11724 12156 12588 13020
E-5 7368 8100 8844 9024 9576 9948 10308 10680 11052
E-4 5928 6528 7716 7416 7716 8016 8304 8604 8904
E-3 5088 5604 6108 6360 6624 6876 7128 7380 7632
E-2 4296 4728 5148 5364 5580 5796 6012 6228 6444
E-l 3828 4212 4596 4788 4980 5172 5364 5556 5748
Note: Values derived by multiplying the monthly value by 12
Source: Navy Times, August 26, 1985 p. 28
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D. DOD READY FOR CHANGE
The Department of Defense is on record that it does not
oppose changing the military retirement system as long as
the change does not impair combat readiness. This position
is also held by most responsible critics of the military
retirement system. [Ref. 12: p. 1]
The military retirement system has existed since 1948
when the statutory retirement age was lowered from 64 to 62
and voluntary retirement after 20 years of service was
permitted with the computed 2.5 percent per year of service
formula. Any change which can enhance the goal of providing




ANNUAL NON-DISABILITY RETIRED PAY (OFFICERS)
YEARS OF SERVICE
GRADE 20 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0-9 34344 37776 41208 42936 44652 46368 48084 49800 51516
0-8 33672 37776 41208 42936 44652 46368 48084 49800 51516
0-7 30444 33492 36540 38064 39588 41100 42624 44148 45672
0-6 23316 27132 29604 30828 34776 36120 37452 38796 40128
0-5 21084 24012 26196 27288 28368 29460 30552 31644 32736
0-4 18252 17364 21900 22812 23724 24636 25548 26460 27372
0-3 15780 17364 18936 19728 20520 21312 22092 22884 23676
0-2 11712 12876 14052 14640 15228 15816 16392 16980 17568
0-1 9240 10164 11088 11544 12012 12468 12936 13392 13860
Note: Values derived by multiplying monthly rates by 12.
Source: Navy Times, August 26, 1985 p. 28
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IV. FLAWS WITHIN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The U.S. Armed Forces provide their members with one of
the nations most generous pension plans. The length of
service required to attain this annuity is a minimum of
twenty years. The ability of immediate collection makes it
one of the most expensive expenditures per capita of the
budget. Since the generosity of this plan has been referred
to throughout this thesis, the author acknowledges the cost
as the primary flaw addressed by critics of the current
system and will elaborate on other flaws within the system.
A. CURRENT NON- DISABILITY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
The key provisions of the military retirement system, as
contained in 125 separate sections of Title 10, United
States Code, are:
• Non-disability retirement after at least 20 years of
active service at any age. An immediate monthly
annuity equal to (base pay) times (years of service)
times 2.5, limited to 75 percent of base pay.
• Optional contributory survivor benefit protection
through retired pay reductions for retirees.
• Cost-of-living adjustment protection for both retired
pay and survivor annuities based on the Consumer Price
Index (CPI).




• No vesting prior to 20 years of service.
• Interrelationships with Social Security, Veterans
Administration benefits, and other Federal service.
• Recall authority, on post-service activity, retention
of military status, and subjection to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. [Ref. 1: p. IV-1]
Voluntary retirement at 20 years of service (YOS) is by
permission from Service Secretary, not by statutory right;
however, it has, in fact come to be considered a right by
Service members and is treated as such by the Services.
1. Length Of Service Required
Supporters of the current system stress that the 20
year retirement eligibility keeps the total force young and
vigorous and enables promotion rates to remain at a desir-
able level. The main concern of the military supporters is
to avoid having 40 to 50 year old infantry men on the front
line
.
John Warner in his studies on productivity of the
naval forces contends that the productivity of a post 20
year individual is higher that his younger counterpart. In
his study Warner made the following statement:
As for increasing retention to the post 20 year
personnel, the marginal cost of keeping them is low,
primarily because the value of retirement benefits grows
very slowly with years of service past 20 years. The
cost of keeping someone from 20 to 30 years is consider-
ably lower than the cost of keeping someone from the 11
to 20 year point. Further, what evidence there is
suggests that 21 to 30 year careerests are no less, and
probably more productive than 11 to 20 year personnel.
[Ref. 13: p. 27]
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Warner goes on to suggest that reducing the pay factor at
the 20 year point and maintaining the 30 year benefit would
substantially increase post 20 year retention.
The current system does not allow a
ny lump sum payment or annuity to the individual who
completes less than 20 years of service. The term "vesting"
refers to paying a lump sum or annuity to a Service member
who completes some minimum required years but doesn't remain
in the Service long enough to be eligible for a 20 year
retirement. Supporters of the vesting idea propose that
this method would help retention early in a career and hope-
fully retain an otherwise doubtful individual to remain in
the service. Another benefit of vesting is that it gives
the Services more flexibility to separate persons involun-
tarily before 20 years of service, because they would still
receive some benefits. Currently a separation pay is given
to officers who are released involuntarily (12 times monthly
pay but not to exceed $30,000) [Ref. 14: p. 13]. This
policy is not exercised very often and there is no similar
authorization for enlisted personnel.
2 . Lack Of Incentives
The current system lacks incentive for post-twenty
years of service. Because of the ability to immediately
draw retirement annuities after completion of twenty years,
a majority of the career service members leave the military
because of the "working for half pay" concept. People
42
unfamiliar with the military retirement system think
retirees get one-half of their current pay as their retire-
ment annuity. In reality the half pay belief is not true
since retirement is based on basic pay and accumulated years
of service. Since neither the allowances nor proficiency
pays are included in the retirement annuities a retirees
monthly check is well short of 50 percent of base pay. For
example a submarine Chief Petty Officer (E-7) retiring after
20 years would draw about 27 percent of his active duty pay
(this reduced annuity is because of the loss of sea pay,
proficiency pay, housing allowance, and subsistence allow-
ance). DOPMA further reduced the annuities. Now retirement
pay is computed by using the average base pay of the last
three years of service.
As stated above, the retirement system is based on
basic pay and length of service. However, within the present
pay tables exists a pay ceiling on senior officers (Admirals
and Generals) ranks. This cap on pay removes any monetary
incentive of these top performers to stay in the military.
One might arguestate that at this level noteworthy duty
assignments alone should be enough to offer the personal
satisfaction needed to retain these officers. But it is hard
to imagine an Executive Vice President of General Motors not
receiving a pay raise when he becomes President or Chairman
of the Board of Directors. With all the mentions of compar-
ability to civilian pay it seems that the talent of these
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proven leaders is obtained for a fraction of that of their
civilian cohorts.
In the enlisted ranks there exist a lack of incen-
tive also. The retirement system fails to provide the proper
retention mix of technicians and combat personnel vice
support personnel. A more structured retirement policy may
place a higher multiple based on the occupational rating
needs of the services . In the enlisted ranks the number of
support personnel that complete a 20 year career, as
compared to combat personnel, is drastically higher.
Retention incentives of some form would be needed as
a quid pro quo for retirement reform. But this does not
necessarily mean that a complete restructuring of military
compensation would be required. Differential bonus payment
or other incentives could be used selectively to retain
mid-level personnel. [Ref. 9: p. 77]
3 . Present Value Of Current Military Retirement
The assumption that the life time value of a mili-
tary retirement is the true value used by individuals when
making a reenlistment decision is not correct. As mentioned
earlier, money has a time value, therefore people must be
compensated for deferring receipt of income.
Tables IX and X show the present value of military
retirement for officers and enlisted members. The tables
attained were computed by using an annualized value at a 10
percent discount rate of the stream of regular payments,
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based on one-half of the basic pay (assuming the individual
enlisted prior to Sept. 1980, otherwise, the annuity would
be calculated based on the highest three years base pay).
The mortality age used was age 73. Each computation was
done assuming the service member had completed ten years of
service and was at age 33 (officers) and 29 (enlisted).
Basic pay was based on the October 1, 1985 pay scale.
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TABLE IX
PRESENT VALUE COST OF CURRENT OFFICER RETIREMENT
GRADE LEVEL 0-5
YOS Ret. Years to Annual P.V. at P.V at
Age Mortality Annuity Ret. Age Age 33
20 43 30 21,084 198,758 76,720
21 44 29 22,140 217,429 72,600
22 45 28 24,012 223,455 71,282
23 46 27 25,104 231,884 67,246
24 47 26 26,196 239,955 63,108
25 48 25 27,288 247,693 59,198
26 49 24 28,368 254,858 55,559
27 50 23 29,460 261,693 51,815
28 51 22 30,552 267,971 48,234






22 45 28 27,132 252,490 80,544
23 46 27 28,368 262,035 75,990
24 47 26 29,604 271,172 71,318
25 48 25 30,828 279,825 66,878
26 49 24 34,776 312,427 68,109
27 50 23 36,120 320,853 63,528
28 51 22 37,452 328,491 59,128






25 48 25 38,064 345,506 82,575
26 49 24 39,588 355,658 77,533
27 50 23 41,100 365,091 72,288
28 51 22 42,624 373,855 67,293
29 52 21 44,148 381,791 62,613
30 53 20 45,672 388,851 57,938
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent
46
TABLE X
PRESENT VALUE COST OF CURRENT ENLISTED RETIREMENT
GRADE LEVEL E-7
YOS Ret. Years to Annual P. V. at P.V at
Age Mortatlity Annuity Ret. Age Age 29
20 39 34 9,912 95,234 36,760
21 40 33 10,404 99, 555 35, 441
22 41 32 11,640 110. 882 35. 371
23 42 31 12,168 115 340 33. 448
24 43 30 12,696 119 685 31. 477
25 44 29 13,224 123. 895 29. 610
26 45 28 15,456 143. 833 31. 355
27 46 27 16,056 148 309 29. 365
28 47 26 16,656 152 568 27. 462
29 48 25 17,244 156 523 25 669
30 49 24 17,844
GRADE LEVEL E-8
160 310 23 886
22 41 32 13,080 124 600 39 747
23 42 31 13,680 129 672 37 747
24 43 30 14,268 134 504 35 374
25 44 29 14,868 139 398 33 292
26 45 28 17,184 159 914 34 861
27 46 27 17,844 164 825 32 635
28 47 26 18,504 169 496 30 509
29 48 25 19,164 173 951 28 527
30 49 24 19,836
GRADE LEVEL E-9
178 206 26 552
25 44 29 16,188 157 ,961 37 752
26 45 28 16,860 179 ,121 39 048
27 46 27 19,980 184 ,555 36 ,541
28 47 26 20,724 189 ,831 34 ,169
29 48 25 21,468 194 ,865 31 ,957
30 49 24 22,200 199 ,444 29 ,717
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent
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V. DECISION MAKER ALTERNATIVES -
The military retirement system has been the subject of
continued examination since it assumed its current form,
soon after World War II. Since 1967, nine major studies
have recommended extensive changes in the retirement system;
two of these have resulted in the formation of comprehensive
legislative reform proposals. Although Congress did not
enact either proposal, it has made other less sweeping
changes in military retirement. In this chapter, three
alternatives to the current system will be reviewed. The
first option is the proposal of the Fifth Quadrennial Review
of Military Compensation. The second option, which is
structurally simpler than the QRMC proposal, is a Department
of Defense proposal which has a variable multiple factor in
computing retirement pay. The third option is this author's
proposal, to use selected reenlistment bonuses in the
undermanned ratings to maintain retention. In the author's
proposal the multiplier will be the same as the DoD proposal
versus, the 2.5 percent of base pay presently used in the
current system.
Each option will be addressed by reviewing the major
changes and by computing the present values of the annuities
paid under each option. Once each option's present value is
attained, then a comparative analysis will be presented
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displaying the savings or additional costs of that option.
Before presenting the options it is imperative to review the
term "economic indifference".
A. ECONOMIC INDIFFERENCE
Rational individuals are indifferent to the timing of
payments they receive as long as the present value of
payments over their lifetime is equal. Using this assump-
tion, an individual would be indifferent about receiving a
reduced retirement annuity as long as a bonus was paid in an
amount such that the present value of both pay systems were
equal. The author offers the following assumption: When an
annuity is reduced, retention of career personnel can be
held at a maximum by preserving the present value of the
retirement benefit. The present value of retirement benefits
can be protected for desired personnel through the use of
SRBs . The objective of using selected reenlistment bonuses
is to maintain the desired manning levels in the ratings
which are undermanned. This selective use of bonuses to
only undermanned ratings reduces the "rents" to individuals
who would have continued their career without a supple-
mental bonus.
If the reader is not familiar with the concept of
present values, he is encouraged to review that section in
Chapter 3.
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B. FIFTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION
This Congressional mandated review was charged by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs
and Logistics). This review paid special attention to the
level and structure of special and incentive pays and to the
military retirement program. QRMC V began by addressing the
question of the Services' requirements for personnel.
Requirements are best expressed in terms of the force
profile, the distribution of officer and enlisted members by
pay grade and length of service. The actual force profile
in existence at any time can and usually does differ form
the Services' objectives. QRMC V found that the Services'
force profile objectives generally paralleled the average of
the force profiles of the past seven years (1976-1982).
QRMC V then asked what the effect would be on the actual
forces and objectives if the current system was replaced by
a different one. More specifically, the study tried to
determine whether an alternative retirement system could
provide the same retention incentives and thus produce an
adequate force profile while reducing cost.
QRMC V concluded that such an alternative could be
found, but that it did not have many of the characteristics
found in earlier studies. QRMC V ruled out reducing the
value of military retirement for members who retire after 20
years or more of service. Equally important, it prescribed
an increase in the value of benefits for those who fail to
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complete 20 years. Thus, instead of recommending reduction
in retirement cost, QRMC actually recommended increases in
retirement cost.
1. Major Changes
QRMC V retained the minimum eligibility for retire-
ment at 20 years and the average of high- three year pay base
for calculating retirement pay. However, the method of
calculating retirement pay was altered. A three percent
reduction for each year short of 30 years of service was
recommended. This meant the maximum percentage of base pay
would remain at 75 percent but the minimum would be reduced
to 45 percent, vice 50 percent of base pay. Along with the
computation change was a change in cost of living adjustment
(COLA). Retirees under age 62 would receive 3/4 of the CPI
increase COLA adjustment upon retirement until age 62.
After age 62, COLA would be equal to the CPI increases.
There would not be any restoration of the lost value caused
by the COLA differentials between retirement age and age 62.
Tables XI and XII give detail retirement pay and present
value costs for enlisted personnel and officers.
The QRMC's recommendation that deviates the most
from the current system is the use of lump sum payments upon
retirement. A member retiring after 20 years or more of
service could receive cash payments equal to twice final
base pay for officers, and three times base pay for
enlisted. Under this system, an individual after 20 years
51
of service, but before retirement, could choose
interest-only loans up to the cash amount.
The lump sum payments do reduce the present annuity
payment. However, the large undiscounted lump sum payments
make this system more expensive than the current system. In
addition, individuals who complete 30 years of service
receive the same 75 percent of base pay as the current
system plus a large lump sum payment. Tables XI and XII
display a comparison to the two annuities. Present value
calculations were attained by using a discount rate of 10
percent
.
Under QRMC's provisions, service members with less
than 12 years of service would be immediately assigned to
this new retirement system. Members already having
completed 12 or more years of service prior to enactment
could have a choice to remain with the current system or
change to the QRMC V proposal.
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TABLE XI
PRESENT VALUE COST OF QRMC 5 ENLISTED RETIREMENT
GRADE LEVEL E-7
YOS Ret. Lump Sum Current QRMC P.V at P.V at
Age Bonus Annuity Annuity Ret Age Age 29
20 39 59,472 9,912 6,938 126 132 48,686
21 40 59,472 10,404 7,595 132 ,148 46,251
22 41 59,472 11,640 8,846 143 738 45,853
23 42 59,472 12,168 9,612 150 584 43,669
24 43 59,472 12,696 10,410 157 607 41,450
25 44 59,472 13,224 11,240 164 779 39,383
26 45 59,472 15,456 13,601 186 042 40,557
27 46 59,472 16,056 14,610 190 267 37,672
28 47 59,472 16,656 15,656 202 880 36,518
29 48 59,472 17,244 16,726 211 293 34,652
30 49 59,472 17.844 17,844 219 782 32,747
GRADE LEVEL E-8
22 41 67,392 13,080 9,940 162 080 51,703
23 42 67,392 13,680 10,807 169 831 49,251
24 43 67,392 14,268 11,699 177 678 46,729
25 44 67,392 14,868 12,637 185 ,788 44,403
26 45 67,392 17,184 15,121 208 ,108 45,367
27 46 67,392 16,844 16,238 217 ,382 43,041
28 47 67,392 18,504 17,393 226 ,711 40,807
29 48 67,392 19,164 18,589 236 ,124 38,724
30 49 67,392 19,686 19,836 245 ,598 36,594
44 76,896
GRADE LEVE1., E-9
14,331 211 ,16325 16,188 50,467
26 45 76,896 16,860 15,938 234 ,521 51,125
27 46 76,896 19,980 18,181 244 ,833 48,477
28 47 76,896 20,724 19,480 255 ,332 45,959
29 48 76,896 21,468 20,823 265 ,906 43,608
30 49 76,896 22,200 22,200 276 ,340 41,174
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent.
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TABLE XII
PRESENT VALUE COST OF QRMC 5 OFFICER RETIREMENT
GRADE LEVEL 0-5
YOS Ret. Lump Sum Current Annual P.V at P.V at
Age Bonus Annuity Annuity Ret . Age Age 29
20 43 84,336 21,084 14,758 223,459 86,255
21 44 84 336 22,140 16 162 235 773 82 520
22 45 84. 336 24,012 18 249 254 234 81 100
23 46 84. 336 25,104 19 832 267 583 77 599
24 47 84. 336 26,196 21. 480 281 092 73 927
25 48 84 336 27,288 23 194 294 867 70 ,473
26 49 84 336 28,368 24 963 308 503 67 253
27 50 84 336 29,460 26 808 321 050 63 ,379
28 51 84 336 30,552 28 719 336 ,192 60 514
29 52 84. 336 31,644 30 694 349 839 57 ,376
30 53 84. 336 32,736 32 714 363 050 54 394
GRADE LEVEL C)-6
22 45 93 264 27,132 20 620 285 ,153 90 ,963
23 46 93. 264 28,368 22 410 300 ,265 87 076
24 47 93 264 29,604 23 979 312 ,911 82 ,295
25 48 93. 264 30,828 25 895 328 ,312 78 466
26 49 93. 264 34,776 30 255 365 074 79 ,586
27 50 93 264 36,120 32 508 382 ,032 75 ,642
28 51 93 264 37,452 34 830 398 ,757 71 ,776
29 52 93 264 38,796 37 244 415 ,350 68 ,117
30 53 93 264 40,128 40 128 434 ,913 64 ,802
GRADE LEVEL C)-7
25 48 121 776 38,064 31 973 411 ,994 98 ,466
26 49 121 ,776 39,588 34 ,441 431 ,198 94 ,001
27 50 121 ,776 41,100 36 ,990 450 ,358 89 ,170
28 51 121 ,776 42,624 39 ,640 469 ,458 84 ,502
29 52 121 ,776 44,128 42 ,382 488 ,295 80 ,080
30 53 121 ,776 45,672 45 ,672 510 ,627 76 ,083
Note: Table der:Lved using a 10 pert:ent discount: rate.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROPOSAL FOR RETIREMENT SYSTEM
This Department of Defense proposal was designed to
comply with the $2.9 billion cut in the accrual fund, from
which persons joining the service in the future will draw
their benefits. The Department of Defense was required by
Congress to provide two proposals to achieve the $2.9
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billion reduction, one involving a COLAs and one which
doesn't affect COLAs. The option to be reviewed in this case
is the option involving the change in the multiplier.
1. Major Changes
The DoD proposal retained the minimum eligibility
for retirement at 20 years, and the average of the high-
three basic pay for calculating retired pay. However, the
major change concerns a variable multiplier. Essentially
there are two ways to change the cost or retirement
benefits. One involves the "multiplier", a figure that is
multiplied by the number of years a person spent in the
military to determine the percentage of basic pay on which
benefits are based. The other way to change retirement cost
is by changing the fraction used in computing the cost of
living adjustment, which is based on the Consumer Index
Price (CPI). As example of the latter, if the CPI increased
by 4 percent the COLA could be increased by less than 4
percentage points. This reduced annuity can have a substan-
tial effect on the retirement costs if the COLA increases
are below the CPI for several years.
As mentioned in an earlier chapter the current
system uses a multiplier of 2.5 percent times the number of
years served to compute the retirement annuity. With the
DoD proposal, retirees would receive 42 percent of their
basic pay after 20 years based on a multiplier of 2.1
percent for each year of service. The multiplier would
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increase to 2.5 percent a year for the next five years so a
member would draw 44.5 percent for 21 years service, 47
percent for 22 years and so forth. Thereafter the 26 year
and beyond the multiplier would increase to 4.5 percent so
retirees would reach the maximum of 75 percent at 30 years.
At the 30 year point the annuity of this proposal would be
equal to that of the present system. [Ref. 15: p. 15]
Comparison of the retirement options will be
presented in the last section of this chapter. Table XIII
and Table XIV give detailed annual annuities and present
values for enlisted and officer personnel under this retire-
ment system. Present values were calculated using a
discount rate of 10 percent.
D. AN ALTERNATIVE: SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS SYSTEM
Those opposed to the current system are interested in
one major objective: Reducing the cost of the military
retirement. The military leaders are against change because
of the effects a reduced annuity may have on retention of
career personnel. Because of Congressional action to reduce
the accrual retirement fund, the question is on longer
"whether" the system changes but "when and how".
If the goal is to simply to reduce retirement cost there
are infinite ways to achieve this goal. However, if the
ultimate goal is to maintain the required career personnel
to keep the force ready then, the goal becomes more complex
and the retirement plan must be more complicated. This
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TABLE XIII
PRESENT VALUE COST OF ENLISTED RETIREMENT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1985 PROPOSAL
GRADE LEVEL E-7
YOS Ret. Years to Annual P.V. at P.V at
Age Mortality Annuity Ret. Age Age 29
20 39 34 8,326 79,996 30,878
21 40 33 8, 818 84 379 29, 532
22 41 32 9. 946 94 754 30. 226
23 42 31 10. 475 99 293 28. 794
24 43 30 11. 003 103 727 27. 280
25 44 29 11. 531 108 037 25. 820
26 45 28 13. 553 126 130 27. 496
27 46 27 14. 628 135 126 26. 754
28 47 26 15. 704 143. 850 25 893
29 48 25 16. 768 152 205 24 961





177 106 476 3322 11. 965
23 42 31 11. 776 111 631 32 373
24 43 30 12. 365 116 570 30 658
25 44 29 12. 964 121 468 29 030
26 45 28 15. 069 140 232 30 570
27 46 27 16. 257 150 ,173 29 734
28 47 26 17 446 159 ,811 28 766
29 48 25 18 635 169 152 27 741





701 137 ,742 3225 14 920
26 45 28 16 879 157 075 34 ,242
27 46 27 18 204 168 ,150 33 ,293
28 47 26 19 539 178 ,984 32 ,217
29 48 25 20 875 189 ,489 31 ,076
30 49 24 22 ,200 199 ,444 29 ,717
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent.
section presents a possible alternative to past recommenda-
tions for retirement plans. The proposal employs the
present value concept. It is structured to reduce cost to
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TABLE XIV
PRESENT VALUE COST OF OFFICER RETIREMENT





malYOS Anr P.V. at P.V at
Age Mortality Annuity Ret. Age Age 33
20 43 30 17,710 166,952 64,443
21 44 29 18, 766 175 821 61 537
22 45 28 20. 519 190 953 60 914
23 46 27 21, 611 199 623 57 890
24 47 26 22. 703 207 961 54 693
25 48 25 23. 795 215 988 51 621
26 49 24 24. 876 223 490 48 721
27 50 23 26. 841 238 430 47 209
28 51 22 28 806 252 658 45 478
29 52 21 30 771 266 108 43 641





185 215 ,759 6822 23 827
23 46 27 24 421 225 578 65 ,417
24 47 26 25. 656 235 016 61 809
25 48 25 26 882 244 ,008 59 ,317
26 49 24 31 565 283 ,579 61 820
27 50 23 32. 909 292 ,330 57 ,881
28 51 22 35 311 309 ,720 55 749
29 52 21 37. 725 326 ,252 53 ,505





191 301 ,282 7225 33 ,006
26 49 24 35 933 322 ,828 70 ,376
27 50 23 37 446 332 ,632 65 ,861
28 51 22 40 188 357 ,491 63 ,448
29 52 21 42 ,930 371 ,258 60 ,886
30 53 20 45 672 388 ,851 57 ,938
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent.
the government. However, rather than stopping at cost
reduction, this proposal, includes the use of selective





The only major change in this proposal is the effi-
cient use of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs). The
current selective reenlistment bonus system is used as an
incentive to enhance retention. The bonuses are determined
by three factors. The first depends on manning level of the
rate and pay grade. Using the manning level, an award
factor is determined ranging from one to six. This award
factor is used to multiplied by the second factor which is
monthly base pay. The third factor is the number of years
for which the individual will reenlist. An example is an
individual in a undermanned rate who has an award level of
3, a monthly pay is $1,200 and he wishes to reenlist for
four years. His reenlistment bonus would be $14,400 (under
the current system bonuses are capped at $20,000). This
bonus is calculated by multiplying $1,200 times the award
level(3), times the number of years, (4).
The current SRB system has flaws. As mentioned
above, there is a cap on reenlistment bonuses. While
$20,000 is a lot of money, it represents a much smaller
percentage pay increase than normally thought. The switch
to lump sum bonuses has had a large effect on retention
rates in recent years. However, even with lump sum payments,
personnel in award level 5 and 6 ratings can reach the cap
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with only three and four year reenlistments . Another flaw
in the current SRB system is that reenlistment bonuses are
paid only to enlisted personnel in zones A, B and C. Zone A
is length of service (LOS) 1-4 years, Zone B is LOS 5-8, and
Zone C is LOS 9-12. By Congressional law, no bonus can be
paid past 14 years of service.
The next section will investigate the cost of using
bonuses to buy back the personnel losses due to reduced
annuities. a selective reenlistment bonus system which will
maintain retention in undermanned ratings.
Using the ACOL and B/REFT models Op-01B3 (Economic
Analysis Department of OPNAV) estimated Navy enlisted
personnel losses which would occur with a change to the
retirement system. The change was the DoD proposal
mentioned earlier. Estimated personnel losses in Zone A
were 525, in Zone B were 526, and in Zone C were 445. Not
all of the projected enlisted personnel loss were in crit-
ical (undermanned) ratings. Ideally SRBs would be used only
to retain those personnel who were in critical ratings. Of
the 525 losses in Zone A only 206 people were considered
critical. However, all individuals in Zone A would receive
the bonus. There were 11,904 reenlistees in zone A. The
award levels ranged from 1 to 5.5 and the average monthly
pay for this LOS group is $931. Thus to maintain these 206
people, the cumulative cost would be $238,080,000. Similar
calculations were employed for Zone B and C. Zone B had 90
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critical personnel and 2,402 reenlistees with a SRB cost of
$21,163,288. For Zone C there were 124 critical persons and
1,520 reenlistees. The reenlistment bonuses cost was
$20,129,360.
From above, the average bonus paid to a person in
Zone A was $20,436. Since the bonus level is capped at
$20,000 the figure for Zone A is $238,080,000. Zones B and
C average payments were were $10,364 and $13,243 respec-
tively. Because these projected bonuses are less than the
cap, no adjustment is required.
The important point is that a retirement benefit cut
of $2.9 Billion is a major savings to the government. The
percent of Navy enlisted personnel in relationship to the
total DoD retirement population over the past 5 years is
23.120 percent [Ref. 1: p. XI- 16]. The Navy enlisted
portion of the $2.9 billion reduction, using this population
percentage, is slightly more than $670 million. The Navy
can maintain critical ratings with about $279 million in
SRB ' s
. In short, the Navy could save $391 million by
substituting SRB for some retirement pay. This is a substan-
tial saving.
2. Use of Bonuses After LOS 14
Over 33 percent of all retirees leave active duty
with exactly 20 years of service [Ref. 5: p. xi]. If the
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rating from which they retired was undermanned, a way to
provide an incentive to continue service is through the use
of bonuses.
The proposed reduction of the retirement funds for
future years will remove $2.9 billion from the accrual
retirement funds. If the Services could barter to receive
some of this money back in the form of SRBs (to be used at
periods after LOS 14) the undermanned ratings could be main-
tained at a higher level. Unfortunately there is not yet a
model to predict how much money would be needed.
SRBs could be used for both officers and enlisted
personnel. These bonuses should be used only to achieve
higher manning levels in undermanned ratings. For example
submarine ratings, aviation personnel, and nuclear trained
personnel would be excellent candidates for this bonus
program. The formula for calculating the amount of the bonus
could be calculated as it is for the current SRB program.
Tables XV and XVI show the cost for both officers and
enlisted. The bonus amounts used in these tables are illus-
trative only.
An example is given to provide an understanding of
how these tables were constructed. An 0-5 under the DoD
retirement proposal has an annual annuity of $17,710. If he
is in an undermanned designator, a lump sum bonus of $20,000
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could be offered for some period of continued service. This
bonus amount does not affect the amount of any future
retirement annuity, but raises the present value of his
retirement benefit from $166,952 (from Table XIV) to
$186,952 (from Table XV). Another point to be emphasized
here is the effect this bonus has on personnel with less
than 20 years of service. As shown in Table XVIII the
present value of the retirement system for an 0-5 with SRB
has increased from $64,443 (from Table XIV) to 72,163 (from
Table (XV), for those personnel with 10 years of service.
For the E-7, Table XVI shows the annuity value increased
from $30,878 (from Table XIII) to 34,738 (from Table XVI),
for individuals with 10 years of service.
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TABLE XV
PRESENT VALUE COST OF DOD PROPOSAL W/SRBS
GRADE LEVEL 0-5
YOS RETIREMENT LUMP SUM ANNUAL P.V. AT P.V AT
AGE BONUS ANNUITY RET. AGE AGE 33
20 43 20,000 17,710 186,952 72,163
21 44 20,000 18,766 195,821 68,537
22 45 20,000 20,519 210,953 67,294
23 46 20,000 21,611 219,623 63,690
24 47 20,000 22,703 225,988 59,953
25 48 20,000 23,795 235,988 56,401
26 49 20,000 24,876 243,490 53,808
27 50 20,000 26,841 258,433 51,169
28 51 20,000 28,806 272,658 49,078






22 45 25,000 23,185 240,759 76,802
23 46 25,000 24,412 250,578 72,667
24 47 25,000 25,656 260,016 68,384
25 48 25,000 26,882 269,008 64,292
26 49 25,000 31,565 308,579 67,270
27 50 25,000 32,909 317,330 62,831
28 51 25,000 35,311 334,720 60,249






25 48 30,000 33,191 331,282 79,176
26 49 30,000 35,933 352,828 76,916
27 50 30,000 37,446 362,632 71,801
28 51 30,000 40,188 382,491 67,048
29 52 30,000 42,930 401,258 65,806
30 53 30,000 45,672 418,851 62,408
Note: Table derived using ;a discount rate of 10 percent.
3 Comparison of Retirement Options.
Table XVII shows the cost comparison between the

































UMP SUM ANNUAL P.V. AT P.V AT
BONUS ANNUITY RET. AGE AGE 29
10,000 8,326 89,996 34,878
10,000 8,818 94,379 33,302
10,000 9,946 104,754 33,416
10,000 10,475 109,293 31,694
10,000 11,003 113,727 29,910
10,000 11,531 118,037 28,210
10,000 13,553 136,130 29,676
10,000 14,628 145,126 28,734
10,000 15,704 153,850 27,693
10,000 16,768 162,205 26,601
10,000 17,844 170,310 25,376
GRADE LEVEL E-8
15,000 11,177 121,476 38,750
15,000 11,776 126,631 36,722
15,000 12,365 131,570 34,602
15,000 12,964 136,468 32,615
15,000 15,069 155,232 33,840
15,000 16,257 165,173 32,704
15,000 17,446 174,811 31,465
15,000 18,635 184,152 30,200








Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent.
chapter. This table relates the cost differentals at the
point of retirement.
Table XVIII shows the present value of benefits as
are perceived by individuals after completing 10 years of
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service. These figures are what the individual should use
when determining cash flows in the future and should be used
in reenlistment decisions.
The most relevant comparison would be of each system
as a whole. This is not presented in this thesis because
information concerning each retiree's rank, length of
service, and base pay could not be attained. In Tables XVII
and XVIII comparisons of pay scales are presented.
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TABLE XVII

















0-5 25 247693 294867 215988 235988
0-5 30 278714 363050 278714 298714
0-6 22 252490 285153 215759 240759
0-6 25 279825 328312 244008 269008
0-6 30 341649 434913 341649 366649
0-7 25 345506 411994 301282 331282
0-7 30 388851 510627 388851 418851
E-7 20 95234 126132 79996 89996
E-7 25 123895 164779 108037 118037
E-7 30 160310 219782 160310 170310
E-8 22 124600 162080 106476 121476
E-8 25 139398 185788 116570 136570
E-8 30 178206 245598 178206 193206
E-9 25 157961 211163 137774 157774
E-9 30 199444 276340 199444 219444
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent
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TABLE XVIII

















0-5 25 59198 70473 54693 56401
0-5 30 41528 54394 41528 44508
0-6 22 80544 90963 68827 76802
0-6 25 66878 78466 59317 67270
0-6 30 50905 64802 50995 54630
0-7 25 82575 98466 72006 79176
0-7 30 57938 76083 57938 62408
E-7 20 36760 48686 30878 34738
E-7 25 29610 39383 25820 29910
E-7 30 23886 32747 23886 25376
E-8 22 37747 51703 33965 38750
E-8 25 33292 44403 29030 32615
E-8 30 26552 36594 26552 28787
E-9 25 37742 40467 32920 37700
E-9 30 29717 41174 29717 32697
Note: Table derived using a discount rate of 10 percent
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VI. EXPLOITING DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT AND PERSONAL
DISCOUNT RATES
A. DEFINITION AND EXAMPLE
A discount rate and discounting are used to determine
the dollar amount which, if it were received today, would be
equivalent in value to a series of future payments. The
importance of ascertaining the personal rate of discount is
demonstrated by the following example. Assume that after 20
years of service, an individual qualifies for a lump-sum
retirement payment of $100,000. This amount could also
represent the present value of a hypothetical retirement
annuity evaluated at the point of retirement. The effect of
this future retirement benefit on an individual's current
retention decision depends on its perceived present value.
The latter is affected first by the discount rate and second
by the remaining time until 20 years of service is
completed. In Table XIX the present value of the future
$100,000 retirement benefit is calculated for several combi-
nations of discount rates and current years of service.
Since personal discount rates affect career decisions,
if the discount rate of an individual is higher than the
government's discount rate, the government saves money by
paying the individual a lump sum payment. This occurs
because the individual values present income more highly
compared to future income than does the government. On the
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other hand if the individual's discount rate is lower than
the government's discount rate then the government would
lose money by paying a lump sum payment. This will be illus-
trated in the section describing lump sum payments.
Alternative assumptions about the discount rate affect
the calculated present value. The implication for
analyzing current and proposed retirement systems (as well
as, other forms of delayed compensation) are quite clear. A
lower discount rate increases the value of future payments.
An individual with a low discount rate will be more posi-
tively influenced in his retention decisions by a future
annuity than an individual with a higher discount rate.
This perceived value for a future annuity increases at a
greater rate for the individual with a low discount rate
than a person with a high discount rate as time passes and
the chance to collect the annuity gets closer. Thus a lower
discount rate has a "pull" effect (attracts the person with
a low discount rate) which increases as the time to draw
upon the retirement benefit approaches.
B. PAST ANALYSIS
Numerous studies have been conducted in attempts to
derive group and individual discount rates for different age
groups. Clyke, Goldberg, Hogan and Mairs estimated discount
rates for Navy enlisted personnel between 15 and 18 percent
[Ref. 16: p. 2]. Black estimated discount rates at 13.5 for
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TABLE XIX
PRESENT VALUE OF $100,000 RETIREMENT BENEFIT
(Available at 20 Years of Service)
Current Year Personal Discount Rate
of Service
.10 .12




.14 .16 .18 .20
14000 10800 8400 6500
27000 22700 19100 16200
51900 47600 43700 40200
100000 100000 100000 100000
both officers and enlisted personnel [Ref. 17: p. 3], These
estimates were within the scope of previous studies accom-
plished by Heckman (18 to 20 percent) [Ref. 18: p. S-12],
Landsberger (9 to 27 percent) [Ref. 19: p. 1351], and
Hausmen (15 to 25 percent) [Ref. 20: p. 1122].
Thus from all of these studies the average discount rate
is 17.8, rounded to 18 percent. All of these studies calcu-
lated real, not nominal discount rates. The government's
discount rate is lower: between 4 and 6 percent. Table XIX
gives an example of how the discount rate can affect the
value of money.
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C. EFFECTS ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS
In attempts to evaluate different retirement systems,
models such as the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model
use annualized rates to combine streams of future earnings
with current income into a single present value measure.
Table XX depicts an 0-4 with twenty years of service
draws an annuity of $18,252. If his discount rate is 18
percent and he draws this annuity for thirty years, then his
present value of the annuity is $100,696. This is the value
of a lump sum payment he would be indifferent about
receiving instead of the annuity. The cost to the govern-
ment of the 0-4 's annuity is $288,587, because the govern-
ment discounts at 5 percent. By paying the individual the
total lump sum, at the individual's discount rate, the
government saves $187,891 and is not obligated for any
future annuity. This savings is derived by subtracting the
government's value of the original annuity ($288,587) from
the individual's lump sum value ($100,696).
In Table XX the individual is given a lump sum of
$20,139 after twenty years of service, which is 20 percent
of his present value of the annuity ($100,696), and a new
annuity of $14,601. The individual is still indifferent
between the two amounts because in present value terms they
are still equivalent. The government now pays the
individual the lump sum value of $20,139, and a new annuity
of $14,601. The present value of this annuity, discounted at
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the government's discount rate, plus the lump sum, is
$184,517. As a result the making the lump sum payment,
which reduced the annuity payments, the government saves
$104,070.
Table XX through Table XXII use similar calculations as
were used above. These tables demonstrate the savings that
can be attained by the government using different individual

























0-5 21084 116320 324124 23264 16867 213512 110612
0-6 27132 139919 417100 27983 21705 272338 144762
0-7 38064 209999 585157 41999 30451 384816 200341
E-7 9912 54684 152377 10936 7929 100200 52137
E-8 13080 72162 201078 14432 10464 132235 68843
E-9 16188 89309 248858 17682 12950 163473 85385
Note:
1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Saving are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5,
E-7, 22 for 0-6, E-8, and 25 for 0-7, and E-9.
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TABLE XXI
SAVINGS AT DISCOUNT RATE 5% GOVERNMENT AND 14% INDIVIDUAL
Lump New New Gov
Grade Annuity Ind PV Gov PV Sum Annuity Gov PV Saving
0-4 18252 127818 288587 25563 14601 189941 98616
0-5 21084 147651 324124 29530 16867 219418 104706
0-6 27132 190005 417100 38001 21705 282355 134745
0-7 38064 266560 585377 53312 30451 369129 216028
E-7 9912 69413 152377 13882 7929 103146 49231
E-8 13080 91599 201078 18319 10464 136122 64956
E-9 16188 113364 248858 22673 12950 168464 80394
Note:
1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Saving are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5, E-7
22 for 0-6, E-8, and 25 for 0-7, and E-9.
1. Variable Lump Sum Payments
The previous tables displayed savings to government
at various discount rates for the individual while main-
taining a government discount rate of 5 percent. Tables
XXIII and XXIV give the savings to the government with lump
sum percentage changes varying from 20 to 100 percent.
Table XXIII represents the savings attained in paying a
retired 0-5 and Table XXIV represents the savings for an
E-7. These two pay grades were used because they represent
the typical pay grades at retirement.
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TABLE XXII
SAVINGS AT DISCOUNT RATE 5% GOVERNMENT AND 12% INDIVIDUAL
Lump New New Gov
Grade Annuity Ind PV Gov PV Sum Annuity Gov PV Saving
0-4 18252 147019 288587 29403 14601 193781 94806
0-5 21084 169831 324124 33966 16867 223854 97270
0-6 27132 218548 417100 43709 21705 288063 129037
0-7 38064 306605 585157 61320 30451 404137 181020
E--7 9912 79842 152377 15968 7929 105232 47145
E-8 13080 105359 201078 21071 10464 138874 62204
E-9 16188 130394 248858 26708 12950 171869 76489
Note:
1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Saving are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5, E-7
22 for 0-6, E-8, and 25 for 0-7, and E-9.
In Fiscal Year 1984 13502 officers and 30002
enlisted personnel retired from active duty. [Ref. 21: pp.
E-7 and F-7]. Based on constant group discount rates, Table
XXV shows the total government saving using a 20 percent
lump sum bonus after 20 years of service. Greater savings
are realized if larger lump sum payments are used.
If all the 1984 officer retirees were pay grade 0-5,
which they are not, and all enlisted were E-7, again an
assumption (but these are certainly attainable ranks within
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TABLE XXIII













25 29080 15813 272173 51950
30 34886 14758 261760 62363
35 40712 13704 251383 72640
40 46528 12650 240996 83127
45 52344 11596 230609 93514
50 58160 10542 220222 103901
55 63976 9487 209819 114305
60 69792 8433 199432 124691
65 75608 7379 189045 135078
70 81424 6325 178658 145466
75 87240 5271 168271 155852
80 93056 4216 157868 166255
85 98872 3270 149141 174982
90 104688 2108 137092 187029
95 110504 1054 126707 197417
100 116320 116320 207804
Note: 1. Discount rate used for the government was 5% and
individual discount rate was 18%
2. Dollars values are 1985 dollars.




the scope of a twenty year career) the saving on total
officer retirement pay would be $1,493,483,224, and
$1,564,214,274 for total enlisted personnel retirement. The
total savings would be $3,057,697,498. This example used an
18 percent individual discount rate because it was closest
to the average figure attained by past analysis. By making
these lump sum payments, the government could save more than
the desired $2.9 billion that will be removed from the
accrual fund. Table XXV shows government savings and costs
using different individual discount rates. (Refer to section
on Past Analysis)
2 . Low Discount Rates
Previous examples used discount rates for the indi-
vidual in the 12-18 percent range and the discount rate for
government at 5 percent. When discount rates decrease, the
value of an annuity increases.
Harry S. Gilman in his research for the Institute of
Naval Studies estimated discount rates for individuals.
Gilman' s study showed that discount rates vary with age and
income levels. Gilman' s discount rate were geometric aver-
aged discount rates, (discount rates that may vary
throughout the life of the individual but are mathematically
formulated into one constant rate). Any economic decision
would be based on these discount rates. In his research
Gilman estimated discount rates for individuals with income
levels of $25,000 (typical for an E-7) and $47,000 (about
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TABLE XXIV













25 13671 7434 134049 18328
30 16405 6938 128752 23624
35 19139 6442 123454 28922
40 21836 5947 118135 34241
45 24607 5451 112875 39501
50 27342 4956 107594 44782
55 30076 4460 102296 50080
60 32810 3964 96999 55377
65 35544 3469 91717 60659
70 38278 2973 86419 65957
75 41013 2478 81139 71237
80 43747 1982 75841 76535
85 46481 1487 70559 81817
90 49215 991 65262 87114
95 51949 495 59964 92412
100 54684 54684 95693
Note: 1. Discount rate used for the government was 5% and
individual discount rate was 18%.
2. Dollars values are 1985 dollars.
3. Annuity used was an E-7 after 20 years of service
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TABLE XXV
TOTAL GOVERNMENT PRESENT SAVINGS WITH LUMP PAYMENTS
Gov Ind Officer Enlisted Total
Rate Rate ( Cost ) /Savings ( Cost ) /Savings ( Cost ) /Savings
5 18 $1,493,483,224 $1,564,214,274 $3,057,597,498
5 14 1,413,740,412 1,477,028,462 2,890,768,814
5 12 1,313,339,540 1,414,444,290 2,727,783,830
5 3 (240,619,142) (251,116,740) (491,735,882)
Note 1. Dollars values are 1985 dollars.
2. Annuities used were that for an 0-5 and E-7 with
20 years of service.
3. Values inside parenthesis represent costs
instead of saving to the government.
4. Lump sum payments of 20 percent of present value
of the annuity was used in deriving savings/costs.
the income of an 0-5) below the 12-18 percent range (using
constant 1985 dollars). For the $25,000 income level Gilman
estimated discount rates of about 7 percent, and for the
$47,000 income level, he estimated discount rates of about 3
percent. This suggests that an 0-5 and an E-7, after twenty
years of service have discount rates of 3 percent and 7
percent, respectfully. [Ref. 22: p. 69] range. This estab-
lishes a case where the discount rate of an individual (an
0-5) is lower than the government's discount rate. The
government's rate of return on long term bonds is slightly
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above 10 percent (nominal); using an expected inflation rate
of 5 percent, the government's real rate is about 5 percent.
Table XXVI gives the additional cost to the government by-
paying these individuals in lump sum payments. In this
case, lump sum bonuses cost the government more because the
government has a higher discount rate than the individual.
TABLE XXVI
COST AT DISCOUNT RATE 5% GOVERNMENT AND 3% INDIVIDUAL
Lump
Grade Annuity Ind PV Gov PV Sum
Gov
New New Add,
Annuity Gov PV Cost
0--4 18252 357736 288587 71547 14601 296008 15421
0- 5 21084 413246 324124 82649 16867 341945 17821
0--6 27132 531787 417100 106357 21705 440027 22927
0-7 38064 746054 585157 149210 30451 617333 32176
Note:
1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Costs are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5,
22 for 0-6, and 25 for 0-7.
3 . Effects of Age and Income Level on Discount Rates
In a previous section of this chapter, the lump sum
payments were varied to show government savings if the
government's discount rate was lower than the individual's
discount rate. This section, using Gilman's discount rates,
will investigate the government savings attainable by using
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lump sum payments at the point of retirement. An individual
at YOS 14 discounts the annuity he will receive at retire-
ment. According to Gilman's research an officer at YOS 14
discounts future payments at rate of 5.5 percent. After 20
years of service he assumes he will retire at the rank of
0-5. His discounted value of the annuity of $21,084 is
$222,211 at YOS 14. The government's discounted value of
the same annuity is $324,124 at YOS 20. These last two
figures can not be compared because they are discounted back
to different years of service. Because the government's
discount rate is lower than the individuals, the government
will save $3,545 by paying this individual a 20 percent lump
sum upon retirement. This savings is computed by subtracting
the government's present value of the annuity without the
bonus at 20 YOS ($324,124), and the government's present
value of the annuity with the bonus at 20 YOS (320,578).
The individual is no worse off because the lump sum and new
annuity have the same present value as the old annuity.
Gilman demonstrated through his research that
discount rates varied by income and age. But at each age and
income level the individual discounts at that constant
discount rate throughout his life. For example an indi-
vidual at age 50 and an income of $47,000 has a discount
rate of 3.1 percent. This individual discounts all future
amount at this constant rate. Using Gilman's constant
discount rates, Table XXVII was derived. Of considerable
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interest is that officers and enlisted personnel, after 14
years of service, do not discount a future retirement
annuity at the same discount rate. In Gilman's study,
people at age 37 and with incomes equivalent to that of an
0-5 discount at a rate of 5.5 percent. Individuals at age 33
and with incomes equivalent to that of a E-7 discount at
10.5 percent. Discount rates were substantially higher for
younger personnel with lower income levels than those
considered in this thesis. Since the government's real
discount rate is 5 percent, the calculations for Table XXVII
used this rate. As shown in that table it would be advise-
able to pay lump sum payments to officers and enlisted
personnel. Enlisted personnel are younger and have lower
income levels than officers and their discount rates are
higher. With this higher discount rate the government saves
more money by paying lump sum payments to enlisted personnel
than it saves by paying lump sum payments to officers.
Still by using this assumption, it is to the government's
advantage to pay both enlisted and officers lump sum
payments upon retirement.
In 1984 there were 3,010 Navy officers and 16,966
Navy enlisted personnel with 14 years of service [Ref. 21:
pp. 8 and 9], Assuming all officers would retire at the 0-5
level and all enlisted personnel at the E-7 level, the
annual savings to the government would be $233,199,516.
Assuming constant discount rates yield the conclusion that
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the government would save even more if one considers when
people decide to make the service a career. Retention rates
for officers increase considerably at the 10 year point,
upon selection to 0-4. Enlisted retention increases after
the second reenlistment , around the 8-10 year period. Table
XXVIII displays similar government savings as Table XXVII
using 10 years of service as the decision point rather than
14. The annual savings to the government in this case is
$290,067,638. Of extreme importance in these cases is the





If the government's discount rate is equal to the
individual's discount rate, then all payments are discounted
equally. With equal discount rates the government would not
benefit or lose by paying lump sum benefits.
5 Discount Rates Vary By Individual
In all the previous sections discount rates for the
individual were group discount rates. The meaning of group
discount rates is that all individuals in the group had the
same discount rate. Realistically, discount rates vary
among individuals. The government would prefer to pay lump
sum payments to people with high discount rates because this
would save the government money. The lump sum payment is an
immediate payment and therefore not discounted. Lump sum
payments would attract people with high discount rates.
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TABLE XXVII
GOVERNMENT SAVINGS WITH CONSTANT DISCOUNT RATES
Ind PV








Gov PV Lump New New Gov.
YOS 20 Sum Annuity Gov PV Saving
280587 53051 14601 277512 3075
324124 61282 16867 320578 3545
417100 78861 21705 412531 4569
585157 110636 30451 578759 6398
152377 17369 7929 139261 13116
201078 22921 10464 183784 17294
248858 28367 12950 227447 21411
Notes :
1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Costs are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5,
E-7 22 for 0-6, E-8, and 25 for 0-7, and E-9.
5. Individual discount rates were 5.5 for officers and
10.5 for enlisted.
6. Individual present values were calculated after 14
years of service. Officer age was 37 and enlisted age 33.
7. Lump sum payments were 20 percent of individuals
present value at 20 YOS.
Individuals with low discount rates would perceive
future annuity payments as having a greater value than indi-
viduals with high discount rates. The government would
prefer paying annuities to people with low discount rates.
Lump sum payments would not be attractive to people with
discount rates lower than the government's discount rate.
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TABLE XXVIII
GOVERNMENT SAVINGS WITH CONSTANT DISCOUNT RATES
Ind PV Gov PV
Grade Annuity YOS 10 YOS 20
0-4 18252 117387 280587
0-5 21084 135568 324124
0-6 27132 174457 417100
0-7 38064 244749 585157
E-7 9912 23772 152377
E-8 13080 31770 201078





















: 1. Annuities are in 1985 dollars.
2. Government Costs are computed over a 30 year period.
3. Lump Sum Payments are given at the point of retirement.
4. Years of service for pay grades are 20 for 0-4, 0-5, E7
22 for 0-6, E-8, and 25 for 0-7, and E-9.
5. Individual discount rates were 6.9 for officers and
12.55 for enlisted.
6. Individual present values were calculated after 10
years of service. Officer age was 33 and enlisted age 29.
7. Lump sum payments were 20 percent of individuals
present value at 20 YOS.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The retirement system, established to support the objec-
tive of national security, has not efficiently met this ob-
jective. The overmanning and undermanning of enlisted
personnel ratings in all Services demonstrates that the
military compensation system is not efficient. Issues of
equity, which most supporters address, are hard to substan-
tiate. Even if the validity of these arguments could be
proven, they are relevant to the question of whether the
retirement system is efficient.
A. HOW TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM
This section leads the reader back to the initial ques-
tion: Should the retirement system be changed? Military
retirement benefits are very generous -- and very ineffi-
cient. The system needs to support Career Force Manning.
The retirement system has very little effect on recruiting,
because potential recruits have large discount rates.
Reallocation of pay, such as proficiency pay and reen-
listment bonuses, is needed to support retention.
Differentiation in pay is required to reward skilled techni-
cians. This can be accomplished with bonuses. Previous
across the board base pay raises have not achieved the
manning levels or proper personnel mix desired. This type of
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pay adjustment undercompensates the highly technical
personnel and will overcompensate the non-skilled personnel.
The system should indeed be changed. This is not a new
recommendation. For the past decade reallocations of pay
have been recommended by numerous agencies and critics.
Reallocation of pay, whether by targeted bonuses, or
targeted educational funds are the efficient way to increase
retention. The same, or perhaps, better recruiting and
retention results could be achieved if the services would
barter for a small percentage of the accrual fund reduction
and use those funds as targeted pays.
If the across the board equity is the choice then, the
use of lump sum payments should be employed by the govern-
ment. As demonstrated in this thesis the larger the lump
sum, based on the present value of the annuity, the more the
saving to the government (if the government's discount rate
is lower than the individual's).
B. WILL THE SYSTEM BE CHANGED
Will the retirement system be changed? Congress has
provided a partial answer to this question. The proposal to
reduce $2.9 Billion has passed both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The President has not
signed this bill into law. However, no suggestions have been
made that he will oppose the change.
The services will fight hard to gain some kind of
compensation for this loss. As with most compensation
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changes, the services will lean towards across the board
compensation packages. Inefficient as this type of payment
is, the services will try to defend their actions a a way of
avoiding breaches of faith. Both of these arguments are
qualitative and impossible to assess quantitatively. As
shown in this thesis, the most efficient way to man the
services is through bonuses.
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